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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS Pau/enes 
Clerk of the Court 
STATE OF UTAH ICaseNo.: 200110164-CA 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, DEFENDANTS' / APPELLANTS' 
APPEAL BRIEF 
vs. 
ROBERT BELTRAN AND 
DOROTHY DEE CARPENTER, 
Defendants / Appellants. 
COME NOW the Defendants / Appellants and appeal from a judgment 
and sentence from the Sixth Judicial District Court, Kane County, Utah, for 
one count each of Aggravated Arson a Second Degree Felony. Date of 
Entry of Judgment appealed from is September 19,2000, and the Trial 
Court denied Defendants Motion for a New Trial on February 21, 2001. 
Defendants were sentenced and ordered to serve 1 to 15 years in the Utah 
State Prison, and pay a fine and surcharge in the total amount of $18,500.00 
the unpaid balance of which shall bear interest as provided by law. 
Defendants sentences we stayed, they were placed on probation and 
ordered to serve one year in the County Jail. 
Mark Shurtleff JimR. Scarth 
Utah Attorney General SCARTH, DENT & WHITELEY, PC 
Kent Barry 150 North 200 East Suite 203 
Assistant Utah Attorney General St. George, UT 84770 
160 East 300 South - 6* Floor Voice 435 628-2884 Fax 435 628-2179 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appellee Attorney for Defendants / Appellants 
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Jim R. Scarth [2870] 
SCARTH&DENT 
150 North 200 East Suite 203 
St. George, UT 84770 
Voice 435-628-2884 Fax 435-628-2179 
Attorney for Defendants /Appellants 
Pauleite Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff /Appellee, 
vs. 
ROBERT BELTRAN and DOROTHY 
DEE CARPENTER, 
Defendants / Appellants. 
Consolidated 
CaseNo.:200110164-CA 
MOTION TO AMEND THE BRIEF 
BY SUBSTITUTION OF TWO 
REVISED PAGES AND A 
REVISED TABLE OF 
AUTHORITIES. 
COME NOW the Defendants / Appellants, by and through counsel, and 
file this MOTION TO AMEND THE BRIEF, filed August 12,2002, in the 
above consolidated case. 
The revised pages, for substitution, are: 
1. page 4 of 45 - which adds the standard of review for Issue III; 
2. page 27 of 45 - which combines the two sentences of the last 
paragraph, into one sentence, in order to clarify a confusion of 
meaning, and includes the extraction of the author's words from 
inclusion in the quote following. That paragraph, as filed, appeared as: 
Ppaf 1 r\f) 
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"Further, it appears that the Trial Judge never made any inquiry of 
the ten jurors seated in this case. That would lead one in mnrlude Huti 
those jurors could judge the case fairly and only on the evidence received 
at trial. 
* + * 
Case law is clear that the trial judge cannot 
leave that determination to conclusions drawn 
by the prospective jurors, themselves. See State 
v. Woolley 810 P.2d 440, (1991)" 
The reused |w<: now u\'i<Is: 
"Further, it appears that the Trial Judge never made any 
inquiry, of the ten jurors seated in this ease, winch would lend one 
to conclude that those jurors could judge the case fairly and only on 
the evidence received at trial. Case law is clear; the trial judge 
cannot leave that determination to conclusions drawn by the 
prospective jurors. See State v. Woolley 810 P.2d 440, (1991)"; 
* * * 
3. pages a and b, of the Table of Authorities, are revised and replaced by 
ide a complete listing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Dated Sepiembei \1, l(\!\l 
Lk 
Jim R. Scarf! 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was mailed, first class postage prepaid, this September 12, 2002, 
to: Mark Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General and Christine Soltis, Assistant Utah 
Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 6a Floor, Salt Lake City, UtaJ 84114-
0854, Attorney for Appellee, ^ \. (P >) 
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Standard of Review for the foregoing. 
"On appeal, we review the record facts in a light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict and recite the 
facts accordingly." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 
339 (Utah 1997). "In reviewing a jury verdict, we 
view the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
verdict," State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1205-06 
(Utah 1993)... . We "present conflicting evidence 
only to the extent necessary to understand the 
issues raised on appeal." Id. at 1206. Questions of 
law are reviewed for correctness. See State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
ISSUE III 
Juror misconduct occurred, and undisclosed bias and prejudice existed, 
during the trial, which justifies a new trial. Preserved for appeal [B-R. 440-
441] [A-R. 255-256]. We review the trial court's ruling denying defendant's 
motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 
245 (Utah 1992) 
ISSUE IV 
The State did not prove the ignition source of the instant fire; therefore, 
they failed to meet their burden under Utah Code Ann § 76-6-103,1995. 
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 P. 
2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). Preserved for appeal [B-R. 422-423, A-R. 253 254]. 
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The trial court made no further inquiry of Justin Jones, as to his place of 
residence, or his knowledge of the case. Further, the Judge never inquired of 
him as to whether he could judge the case fairly. 
Prior to seating the jury, the Trial Judge learned that jurors, Blain and 
Wendy Harris, were brother and sister-in-law. [R. 494, P. 148] The Judge 
made no follow up inquiry of Blain Harris. 
Of the ten jurors seated to try the case, not one was asked any pointed 
questions, which would determine their ability to fairly judge the case. One of 
the errors, discussed above, is egregious; to wit: the Trial Court's failure to 
follow up and ask Justin Jones what gossip he had heard about the case. Justin 
Jones knew something about the case [R. 494, P. 85]; however, with no follow 
up inquiry by the Court, we are left not knowing whom he had learned it from 
and what he had heard. We only know he had heard gossip about the case. Did 
that affect his ability to try the case fairly? Did that have an affect on the 
outcome of the trial? We will never know. 
Further, it appears that the Trial Judge never made any inquiry, of 
the ten jurors seated in this case, which would lead one to conclude that those 
jurors could judge the case fairly and only on the evidence received at trial. 
Case law is clear; the trial judge cannot leave that determination to conclusions 
drawn by the prospective jurors. See State v. Woolley 810 P.2d 440, (1991): 
* * * 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently 
emphasized that "it is [the trial Judge's] duty to see that 
the constitutional right of an accused to an impartial jury is safeguarded, State v. Dixon, 560 P.2a 318, 
319-20 (Utah 1977), and has reversed criminal 
convictions based solely on the appearance that such 
right may have been jeopardized. *fn4 Accordingly, 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Section 8-2a-3(2)(f) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
4 
(Preservation for appeal on the record) 
ISSUE I 
The Trial Court erred in denying Defendants' / Appellants' Motion to 
Quash the Search Warrant and Suppress Evidence Seized. Preserved for appeal 
at [B-R. 112-115, A-R. 96-99] The standard of review of a magistrate's
 ( 
finding of probable cause, for the issuance of a search warrant, was stated in 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1259-1260 (Utah 1993) (citations and 
footnotes omitted): ^ 
In reviewing the magistrate's finding of 
probable cause to support a search warrant based on an 
affidavit, we will find the warrant invalid only if the 
magistrate, given the totality of the circumstances, < 
lacked a "substantial basis" for determining that 
probable cause existed. . . . In conducting this review, 
we will consider the search warrant affidavit in "its 
entirety and in a common-sense fashion" and give 
"great deference" to the magistrate's decision. ... The 4 
affidavit must support the magistrate's decision that 
there is a "fair probability" that evidence of the crime 
will be found in the place or places named in the 
warrant. 
"We review the factual findings underlying the 
trial court's decision, to grant or deny a motion to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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suppress evidence, using a clearly ei roneous standard. 
• We review the trial court's conclusions of law based on 
these facts under a correctness standard." State v. 
Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854-55 (Utah 1992). Accord 
State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
ISSUE II 
r
' * • •** Tidment m iij-'jill lo cITcrtn, c nssist^mv niYmmttsd \\ is 
violated when 1 rial Counsel was ineffective, during the selection ui hie jury, 
allowing iuror* to he seated who were employed by. or related to, c\ 1:4 Joyees of 
the City (*: -»,mi .i.u- - ***** enfoi cement officers of the Cit> of Kanab, and 
or Kane Countv 'he i nal ( ourt committed plain error in failing to remove 
111 lose sail . u in 111 II h e l m \ 
; ue I )efendants' / Appellants' Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel was violated when Trial Counsel, was 
ineffect i \ e in failing to pursue an issue of a furor who was not a 
( ] tahi esident .' ' • ' ., ' 
b. rhe Defendants' • 'nv-ntriph? 
effective assistance of counsel was violated, at trial, when Trial Counsel was 
ineffective in failing to properly pursue inquiry of three iuro? v one of which 
lulkedhn \ itnesses about the case, [K.4 **
 ( - - « r M* .. *> * 
Standard of Review for the foregoing a. b. 
J O « « ^ ," ~ ~ ~ " ~ - " ' ~ * in.. i r i ,r „, - ~ J n 
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In ruling on an ineffective assistance claim, "...we defer to the trial court's 
findings of fact, but review its legal conclusions for correctness." State v. * 
Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 531 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 945 P.2d 1118 (Utah 
1997). 
c. The trial judge committed plain error by failing to conduct a i 
sufficient inquiry of certain prospective jurors who were seated to 
try the case. 
I 
Standard of Review. 
Citing from State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 
348 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Ut App 1998): < 
Plain error is determined under the legal 
standards applicable at the time of trial, 
see Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1228 (holding that 
counsel ineffectiveness "based on an 
oversight or misreading of law" must be 
based on "the lawr in effect at the time of \ 
trial"); State v. EUifritz, 835 P.2d 170,174 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("When defendant 
raises the issues of both plain error and 
ineffective assistance of counsel,'a 
common standard is applicable.'" (quoting 
State v. PWe,770P.2dll6,124n.l5 * 
(Utah 1989)). 
The Standard of review for "plain error" 
is found at f 5 of State v. Hittle, 47 P.3d 
101, 2002 UTApp 134 (Utah App. ' . 
04/25/2002) A finding of plain error % 
requires that (i) an error occurred; (ii) the 
error was obvious; and (iii) the error was 
harmful. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 
403 (Utah 1994) (citing State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993)). 4 
d. The Trial Court eired in failing to grant Defendants' / Appellants' 
Motion for a New Trial. Preserved for appeal at [B- R. 426-427, R. 
i 
A-R.255 -256]. 
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Standard of Review foi llie loregoing. 
"On appeal, we review the record facts in a light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict and recite the 
facts accordingly." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 
339 (Utah 1997) ' i a reviewing a jury verdict 
view the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
verdict," State v Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1205-06 
(Utah 1993) ... . We "present conflicting evidence 
only to the extent necessary to understand the 
issues raised on appeal." Id. at 1206. Questions of 
law are reviewed for correctness. See State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
ISSUE III 
Juror miscondu*. occurred an* . . i- i.su prejudice .\i,u.l 
illlllMU Ilk lll.ll will* 
l l l | | A K 5^5 ->%| 
ISSUED IV 
The State did not prove the ignition source of the instant fire; therefore, 
they failed to meet their burden under Utah Code Ann § 76-6-103, 1995. 
heseim! I-»I ,i|>peal il |IU! IJ.J. IJ>, A \< >''4 2M| 
Questions nl I; hi lie tevieued fouorrctlness See Shite v \\ na 869 
P.2d 932,936 (Utah 1994). 
/~»«„« U l A f ^ ^ V ' n , i r i c in.,.. : c K i 
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STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL ITEMS 
See addendum 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
Approximately 4:15 a.m., on March 24,1998, a fire was observed by 
Kanab resident, David Winkleman, at the Frontier Bar-B-Q & Steak Restaurant, 
located at 1143 South Highway 89A, Kanab, Kane County, Utah. Winkleman 
went to the residence of Robert Schafer, who, in turn, called Kane County 
Dispatch. Before the firefighters arrived at the scene, Kanab City Police 
Officer, Brett Smith, accompanied by Winkleman, entered the building to 
ascertain that no one was inside. They found that the fire was confined to the 
dinning area of the restaurant, located in the southwest corner of the ground 
floor level of the building, and that the basement of the building appeared to be < 
occupied by the owners of the business as a residence. In the two basement 
bedrooms, they reported observing that drawers, from dressers, were stacked in 
a pyramid fashion and that areas of the dry wall ceiling material were missing, ( 
thereby exposing the floor joists. They observed a storage closet / pantry, 
between the two bedrooms, and located on the top shelf thereof were restaurant 
napkins, which were placed at intervals, rather than grouped together. The floor * 
joists were likewise exposed above the closet / pantry. They reported a strong 
odor, similar to paint thinner or solvent, coming from the basement. A canvass 
for remnants of drywall, which might have come from the ceilings, revealed 
nothing. In the kitchen of the restaurant, located on the main floor, a half-gallon 
container was found with a small amount of orange juice still present. Located 
next to it was a coffee cup, approximately half-full of orange juice. There were 
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no itppnu'iil l ' • *a* * < * -•• •* •* by 
firefighters and lav*, enforcement personnel ns ncrs niv i s ? ; 
Defendants appellants, according to Kanab resident J oe J ohnson, a Kanab 
Independent i cpairnian mechanic w ho was working on Doi othy Carpenter ' s 
1991 Camaro, were out of town, in the Phoenix / Mesa area, and had been for 
1 hi eeiiavs |K I'M p| IIIIIH111 I K < I | 
This fire occurred in Kanab City and Kanab City Police officers heli 
14] does not particularly describe the things to be sc ,\ d I h>* om\ u \u uined 
and the Search Warrant, and also listed on the return of the Search Wurrant. ~~ 
search warrant, officers seized other items that the p: - CLUIU evidence 
in the inr\ ^ :a! in this case. The affidavit of A Ian Alldredjie >• Mv Kanab 
:.-,: 'epartment, was used as proof justificat io< • i* >cau . * . , il 
i towever tf is unclear, and reads as though he is reciting hearsay from Smith 
the informants, or their information. [See affidavit of Alan Alldredge State's 
Exhibit #5. R 492 j 1 C 1 lini $21 ] 
The Search Warrant was issued by the SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COX JRT, IN AND FOR KANE O >! ^ P T , STATE OF UTAH. Gerry H H< >yt, 
a Justice Com t J udge of the Quic. * *ik . - cinct, signed the Search Warrant on 
behalf of the Sixth District Cow*1 n-. H Hovt was and J> neither a District 
I attorney isrequin 
r \ . ., '/ ~ ^ ~ * ^ ^ * — *
 Tit _ ,., k £ k . r K Hi..,: c > A,. _ 1 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I 
The subject Search Warrant fails to particularly describe the things to be 
seized. The Search Warrant, in this case, was not a lawful warrant; rather, 
merely a constitutionally prohibited "General Warrant". 
No justification existed for any search of the basement area, or anything 
viewed, discovered, or otherwise seized, and everything obtained from the 
basement, must be suppressed. Certain evidence, seized on 25 March, 1998, 
was not seized under the "Search Warrant," and must, therefore, be suppressed. 
The search warrant is void, not having been issued by a qualified judge, or 
magistrate, of the Sixth Judicial District Court, for Kane County, Utah. 
Purported "evidence", obtained under the invalid Search Warrant, is 
inadmissible. 
The Trial Court erred in denying Defendants' / Appellants' motion to 
quash the search warrant and suppress the evidence seized. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ISSUE II 
The Trial Judge committed plain error by failing to conduct a sufficient 
inquiry of certain prospective jurors who were seated to try the case. 
The trial judge has an affirmative duty to interview prospective jurors 
sufficiently, and to determine whether or not each person can fairly try the case. 
See section 78^16-8, Utah Code annotated, 1953, as amended. 
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I vf MARY OF ARGUMENT 
ISSUEIII 
Juror misconduct occurred, resulting in undisclosed bias and prejudice, 
during , < 
100 West, Kanab. * a \ho is man K\i \o C ohn \Vuienester ihcn •. omiiv 
Attorn. • . ,><;•• • s * •• • - Plaintiff, the State 't'l Mh " 
i • v.as<. • lie e\ paitc c«»m,iv. • >ti. ii ica> >v.> member ot the iury; one of 
which was foreman of the jury, and additionally, ex parte contact occurred with 
the wife of a third juror, [R.503 p40.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
s ISSUE IV 
The State did not prove the ignition source of the instant fire; therefore, 
they failed to meet their burden, under Utah Code Ann § 76-6-103,1995. 
76-6-103. Aggravated arson. (1) A 
person is guilty of aggravated arson if by 
means of fire or explosives he 
intentionally and unlawfully damages: 
(a) a habitable structure; or 
(b) any structure or vehicle when any 
person not a participant in the offense is 
in the structure or vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the 
first degree. 
Amended by Chapter 59, 1986 General 
Session 
The State Fire Marshal, 1 ,ynn Borg, testified, "No, I don't know exactly 
wh.il ignited lli.il ritlie lii< ' |l ' ] 
r< u -ir\r\i m c A r~* \ T-» o . r < r T- • ~ • i 
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The States Prosecuting Attorney, Colin Winchester, stated clearly in his 
closing argument, "... a slow burning source? I can't tell you. Our expert never j 
found the source for this. An electrical fire rigged somehow in~I can't tell you. 
We have seen lights that were in the area that the expert says probably were not 
the cause. But something happened in that attic and I submit to you that it was i 
not wholly accidental." [R.500, p. 21,11. 20-25] 
ARGUMENT 
I 
Issue I 
Point I 
THE SUBJECT SEARCH WARRANT FAILS TO PARTICULARLY 
DESCRIBE THE THINGS TO BE SEIZED. 
The Fourth Amendment states that, "no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing...the...things to be seized." (Compare Utah Const., Art, I, § 14 
i 
identical in substance and effect).1 The Fourth Amendment is not satisfied by 
recitals that describe general categories of "things" which, though they may be 
made the proper subject of a search warrant, fail to command law enforcement 
to search for and seize items, which are described with as much particularity as 
circumstances permit. See generally 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 
4.6(d)(3ded., 1996). , 
!For discussion of Fourth Amendment's application in the investigation of 
residential fires, see Michigan v. Clifford, 464 WS 287 (1984). 
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As ,111 rMinpk 1 ii iiiri'e i v t e i r n r r In l l i r w«r<iiHHIII msnl iiiii tin* ,nimkd 
i obbe ry" is too vague as 'weapon is a generic teiin that could applv ten a variety 
of ins t ruments" , and,,, the affidavit coi ild surely be more specific as to the kind of 
, . . . • - •5 ,3121 1 E 2< 1 7 1  8(111 < \ | i|: > 19 J < 1 ) See i il s< >, 
State v . vin^ion M / ^ W 2d 646 (Mo. 1982) (warrant for " w e a p o n " too 
• ^ <. c s f I T I i i g l a i > t o o l s r mi'. I  11 s 11111 n e111, 11 \ i I h< •) i '' „ in • 
s imply hand l o o h unsigned lor lawful use ,M-J nc intent to use or possess them 
unlawful 1v ar>pen? - -vu: m a n \ tools resemhie anothei ?s ' "  In re 1969 
Plymouth Roadrunner, 455 S.W.2d 466 (Mo.1970) See aisc >, 2 LaF a ve, at 568, 
m.84 (citing numei ous authorities), 
for the purpose of locating, and preserving, mere evidence that might hopefully 
warrant did not particularly describe the orange ji lice container, or the half full 
coffee • ivanted to seize them. and indeed the; ' did 
•<t/e then: • ue subjtxt hie mo^ % crtainly was not started b) the me ans < )1 
must have indicated that these items may well have helped to establish the 
identity of the persons who may have been present when the fire was started. 
The w ai i uipai tu •+ Icnni^ slioes-sutitli 
outside porch or one pair of Nike tennis shoes/inside of south door, oi yeilli H \ 
ilfisliliglil ,.., .,,,. ,, IIIIUI I»I olhi « ih, iih I lie iiiiu;silh,ii, , .ppaienllv w mini 
1o seize those items, and indeed, tnev did seize them The warrant, also, did not 
describe other undisclosed items, • *• materials, " ,,o! Ii st eel : j 11 1 u \ ,C,„R E l 1 IK N 
O F S E A R C H W A R R A N T " , but invest igators apparently wanted to seize them, 
r .^> * ~»A^1M&A PA "Donro l H -^f* 4^i lD,»-„f< k-P t,-in i ALII 1,11 4 .,1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and indeed, they did seize them. The subject fire most certainly was not started 
by the means of those additional items, but the circumstances in which they 
were initially observed must obviously have indicated that the investigators 
believed these items might well have helped to establish the identity of persons 
who may have been present when the fire started. Those facts should have been 
articulated in the affidavit. 
•V 1* V 
One may assume that the instrumentalities of a crime 
will likely be found at, or near, the location where the 
offense was committed, or in the perpetrator's 
possession. Indeed, it has been noted "[a] description 
of instrumentalities or evidence in general terms raises 
the possibility that there does not exist a showing of 
probable cause to justify a search for them." 2 
LaFave, at 575. On the other hand, at one time it was 
held that a warrant could not be issued for the seizure 
of "mere evidence". See generally, 1 LaFave § 2.6(d). 
This is no longer a rule oflaw, but remains an 
expression of the fact that if "mere evidence" cannot 
be described with particularity, the assumption of its 
existence seldom constitutes probable cause. As 
Professor LaFave has noted: 'Quite obviously, a 
distinction must be drawn between instrumentalities 
and evidence where the description is limited to the 
type of criminal conduct involved; while, as noted 
above, this may sometimes be sufficient as to 
instrumentalities, it of course is not sufficient as to 
evidence." 2 LaFave, at 568. 
The defect in the subject warrant was not the consequence of law 
enforcement's inability to establish probable cause to believe that certain 
specific items of evidence might, in fact, be found on the subject premises. 
The defect did not arise from the investigators' lack of specific 
information from which these items could have been described with 
particularity. 
n f\s\/\t M s~ A *~\ A T l ~ ~ ~ 1 1 ^C A C #*~na+- A M 
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which particularly c lesciibed the "I i re sets" the> maj have wanted to 
photograph, and the "strong smell of solvent", the soi iree of which they w anted 
limited to those things, which they could articulate, and desci ibe, with 
I M r l u . ' i i h i n l y . • • • , • • ' - • , , -, 
- .The description of things in a wai rant limits the permissible intensity; and 
been located and seized, the officers executing said warrant must tei iiiinate their 
intrusion. See ^eneralK 7 / ^:<iv~ > I MM* **>r\ ,-mwM extend their 
c * ittnit: a wairai ) •. ; .. *k . ; M ^ M M JIJJCU^, , ;^ 
evidence *** which they are aware substituting there fore the statutorily defined 
categoiK - H> w. 
describing nothing .n a 
Defendants7 premises loi the tallowing illegitimate icasons, illegitimate, 
because the vM-estnrato!^  had no reason io believe Mui **• \ .* e*' I 
produce information that wouid wsrgest that ih* ; defendants, or anyc . -iad 
been involved in the commission of a public offense. 
1. Iiivesti^Jiois WrtnhdtosH vvliilliu in Ihcn estimation (lie 
Defendants had removed irreplaceable personal effects from the premises before 
the 
2. Investigators wanted to see whether, or not, in their estimation, 1 he 
Defendants had rem : : clothing, and othei items nil" personal propcrh v In Hi 
had the entire building burned, w oi ild ha < • ; 1 u i i i hiiiiiai as lost. 
C!flQP . : ' A ^ - - - 1 ^ - r 4^ " D ^ ' ^ - P ., A , „. 1 
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i 
3. Investigators wanted to see whether, or not, in their estimation, the 
business, which Defendants had operated on the premises, had been profitable, $ 
or otherwise viable. 
This warrant was not issued to determine the nature, and location, of the 
fire's origin, or for the purpose of resuming a routine fire investigation. { 
Option 1 {It was issued for the purpose of conducting a criminal 
investigation that would, hopefully, reveal the identity of the person, or persons, 
responsible for committing what investigators had, already, assumed was arson.} f{ 
Option 2 {It was issued for the sole purpose of conducting a criminal 
investigation, or fishing expedition, which would hopefully reveal "evidence" 
supporting the authorities' assumption as to the identity of the person, or 
persons, responsible for what they had presumed to be arson.} 
The "recitals", in the first paragraph of the search warrant, describe, in 
i 
language obviously patterned after the text of Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23-202(1) 
and -202(3), those general categories of "things for which search warrants 
properly may issue, to wit: "[PJroperty or evidence [which] was unlawfully 
acquired or unlawfully possessed, and consists of any item or constitutes 
evidence of..." The "command" portion of the warrant is devoid of any 
description of the "thing" to be seized. It reads:
 i 
* * * 
YOU ARE THEREFORE 
COMMANDED to make immediate 
search of the above described real 
property, including the curtilage and all 
outbuildings and personal property 
located on or about the curtilage. 
* * * 
-• *\ I* A r Tl**<^^+ s*m A n r v a o l 
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As a consequence of the failure to describe that which there was probable 
cause to believe would be found on the pi emises, b> purpor t ing to authorize a 
search for "everything", the warrant, in fact, constitutionally authorized no 
search at ill I. 
Point II 
T H E P U R P O R T E D S E A R C H W A R R A N |[ |[| f THIS CASE l \ i S NOT A 
LAWFUL WARRANT, BUT NOTHING MORE T¥ 
01 il S I I I H J I KM J" I KoHIBi? -• * - AKKAIN1". 
In United States of Amei i n \ i * »MC» d^ 846 r ! 
I Jnited States Court of A ppeaF f<- the IVuth i MUII d* XSCHIKU warrant 
which authf *i ved a search « » f ***wi ^ ^ ^dence u^ '*>e preserve of marijuana, a 
Reminp • gauge si ui i-..** — *. .jainumou ^ -•$ 
caliber special pistol with a certain so? iai numbei a 22 caliber Ruger * nrFuu: 
v ill ,i ^ 
stock, and ^ nunibei 
The officers arrived at the 
They located marijuana in the boi» * HMH. md found firearms, ammunition, and 
drug paraphernalia throughout the residence and the barn 
Ovei a IK,1!in " '" -. .cral hours, the oi ficers also located other ''evidence' " 
including a number of videotapes showing Mr, Foster involved in sexual acts 
v (flu IKS islc.'iidiiiifiji » In, usr ol I IMJI I IMIM, iiiiiin hiding one scene 
involving three of four young females smoking marijuana on the couch in his 
livnv AH of the "evidence" w as - ': • ', i ii :: h icll ngl hat < Iiiidi "« v; 
listed in the search warrant. The search of hoster s residence lasted from * 25 
( ! a s e tt 7 0 0 1 0 1 fi&~ If * 4 P a r r o 1 4 r r f 4 S r > ~ ^ , 4 1 
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p.m., until approximately 11:00 p.m. Although the warrant specifically 
described the items that were to be seized, when the officers left, they took 35 
items with them, "including various firearms, ammunition, video tapes, 
marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and other miscellaneous items". The officers 
also seized anything of value in the house. 
Foster was charged in a 12 count superseding indictment with various 
violations of United States law. He moved to suppress all property seized, 
during the search, because the search "substantially exceeded the scope of the 
warrant and there was flagrant disregard for the terms of the warrant as to the 
property to be seized." The District Court suppressed the evidence, including 
those items specifically listed in the warrant. 
Under the law in the Tenth Circuit, even evidence that is properly seized, 
pursuant to a warrant, must be suppressed if the officers executing the warrant 
exhibit flagrant disregard for its terms. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the basis for blanket 
suppression, when a search warrant is executed with flagrant disregard for its 
terms, is found in our traditional repugnance for "general searches", which were 
conducted in the colonies, pursuant to writs of assistance. 
The Tenth Court of Appeals quoted the United States Supreme Court, in 
the case of Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192,196 (1927), and stated: 
"The requirement that warrants 
shall particularly describe the things to be 
seized makes general searches under them 
impossible and prevents the seizure of 
one thing under a warrant describing 
another. As to what is to be taken, 
nothing is left to the discretion of the 
officer executing the warrant." 
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•p *T *"f* 
The Tenth Court of Appeals went on to state: 
* * * 
Therefore, Medlin II establishes 
that "[w]hen law enforcement officer 
grossly exceed the scope of a search 
warrant in seizing property, the 
particularity requirement is undermined 
and a valid warrant is transformed into a 
general warrant thereby requiring 
suppression of ^ evidence seized under 
the warrant. 
Finall* * -^arch warrant, issued in this case, is a 
constitutionally prohibited general warrant, because of its failure to define, 
specifically, the purported evidence to be seized; and also, because it authorizes 
a general search. 
I'MIIII III 
BASEMENT AREA, OR ANYTHING VIEWED, DISCOVERED, OR 
BASEMENT, MUST BE SUPPRESSED. 
the search of, the basement, by Kanab City fiid ij-hlers, and others, in the instant 
riisiv viis .iiii.l is unreasoiuMi k'king:i|> , <• n .^ . 
Firefighters do, of course, have the necessary right to enter a burning 
home in an effort to put out the fire. Once inside, they are permitted to locate 
the origin of ,.ie lire and determine its cause. 
* \* »-i I, 1 1^ - P 1 " C '. TO*> I A i, P in % \ .I HI i i 1 
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i 
In this case, evidence presented at the Preliminary Hearing showed that 
the fire had started in the attic space, and that, beyond all doubt, there was no j 
fire whatsoever in the basement area. [R. 491, p. 107,11. 24-25, pl08,11.1] 
There was never any valid reason for the firefighters, the police, or anyone else 
to enter the basement area. Appellants held privacy interests in the residence | 
and in the basement, and the entry of the firefighters, and police, therein, both 
before and after the issuance of the purported warrant, was unreasonable. 
Because the origin, and purported cause, of the fire was believed to be * 
known, upon search of the main floor and the attic area of the home, no 
justifiable search could be made of the basement. Since it had been determined 
that the fire had originated in the attic area, the scope of any legal search was 
limited to the attic area and the area in which the fire occurred. 
Odor cannot serve as a basis for a warrantless search. See Taylor v. U.S., 
286 U. S. 1 (1932), and Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). 
As indicated above, no valid warrant existed. No entry should have been 
made into the residential area of the building, which was the basement. All 
"evidence", seized in the basement, and all testimony related thereto, must be 
suppressed. 
Point IV 
CERTAIN EVIDENCE SEIZED ON 25 MARCH, 1998, WAS NOT 
SEIZED UNDER THE "SEARCH WARRANT," AND MUST, 
THEREFORE, BE SUPPRESSED. , 
Following the execution of the warrant, issued and executed on 24 March, 
1998, the State again invaded Defendants' premises on 25 March, 1998, and 
removed additional items, without any lawful authority, or permission, i 
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whatsoever. This subsequent entry, search, and seizure was, and is, 
unreasonable, per se, and violated Defendants' state and federal constitutional 
rights to be free from same. 
Point V 
THE SEARCH WARRANT IS VOID, NOT HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY 
A QUALIFIED JUDGE, OR MAGISTRATE, OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, FOR KANE COUNTY, UTAH. 
At the Suppression Hearing of this matter, it was disclosed that Mr. Gerry 
Hoyt is only a Justice Court Judge, in Orderville Precinct, Kane County; that the 
warrant, purportedly issued by him, dealt with a location outside of Orderville 
Precinct, Kane County; and that Mr. Hoyt was never lawfully appointed, as a 
judge of the District Court, for the purpose of issuing warrants. 
Under Article VIII, Section 1, Utah Constitution, certain Courts are 
created, which are known as "Justice Courts". Judges of these Courts are Justice 
Court Judges. See UCA 78-5-101 (1953, as amended). 
A review of the county records, of Kane County, shows that there are two 
justice precincts in Kane County; those being Orderville Precinct, and Kanab 
Precinct. In addition, there is a Kanab City Municipal Justice Court. 
Mr. Hoyt took his oath of office, as Justice Court Judge, in Orderville 
Precinct, on, or about, 7 July, 1993. He apparently posted some form of bond in 
connection with the Justice Court position, on, or about, 3 April, 1998. That 
bond was to serve in connection with the position as Orderville Justice Court 
Judge. 
r-ico u nnmntzA r>\ r\—10 <***-
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Appellants assert that, although purportedly appointed by this Court, Mr. 
Hoyt acted outside the boundaries of his precinct when he issued the warrant for 
a search in Kanab City Precinct, rather than in Orderville Precinct. Further, 
Defendants assert that Mr. Hoyt could not have been appointed to serve as a 
Magistrate of this Court without the written approval of the Court Judicial 
Counsel, and further assert that no such lawful approval has been filed. Mr. 
Hoyt purported to sit, in the District Court, as a judge, pursuant to a certain order 
signed by the Honorable Judge David L. Mower, dated 5 March, 1997; 
purportedly pursuant to the authority of Rule 4-610, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
On page 6 of the transcript of the Preliminary Hearing, Mr. Hoyt indicated 
that he was "working here in Kanab pro tern for approximately two more 
weeks..." [R. 491,P. 6,11.12-13] 
It now appears that there is a certain "General Order No. 1997-1", signed 
by the Honorable David L. Mower, on, or about, 5 March, 1997, purporting to 
appoint Mr. Gerry Hoyt as a Magistrate in the Sixth Judicial District Court of 
Kane County, State of Utah, for various purposes. The order, by its terms, was 
purportedly issued, pursuant to the terms of rule 4-610, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
Rule 4-610. Appointment of justice court judges to preside at first 
appearances, preliminary hearings and arraignments in felony cases. 
Intent: 
To establish the criteria for the appointment of justice 
court judges to preside at first appearances, 
preliminary hearings and arraignments in felony cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the district and the justice 
courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
~ •"*»"• . T>«0fr»n Anneal 
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(1) The presiding district court judge may appoint a justice court judge to preside at a first appearance, 
preliminary hearing or arraignment if: 
(A) the justice court judge consents to the 
appointment; and 
(B) the justice court judge has either completed a 
course in the conducting of first appearances, 
preliminary hearings and arraignments, or has presided 
over at least five first appearances, preliminary 
hearings and arraignments prior to the effective date of 
this rule. 
(2) A justice court judge may only accept a plea of not 
guilty, or not guilty by reason of insanity. 
(3) The Justice Court Administrator shall maintain a 
list of those justice court judges who meet the 
qualifications set forth in paragraph 0)(B) above. 
(4) The administrative office snail offer courses in the 
conducting of first appearances, preliminary hearings 
and arraignments, and shall pay the expenses of justice 
court judges attending such courses not offered in 
conjunction with the annual justice court judges 
conference. 
(5) Hearings conducted pursuant to this rule shall be 
conducted on the record. 
On its face, Rule 4-610, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, might 
appear to authorize the appointment of Mr. Hoyt to hold preliminary 
examinations and to accomplish bind-overs. The rule, however, requires that 
such an order be signed by the Presiding Judge of the Judicial District. District 
Judge Mower did not even assert that he signed General Order No. 1997-1 in the 
capacity of Presiding Judge. 
On the other hand, it cannot but be admitted, by all concerned, that Mr. 
Hoyt purported to function in a judicial capacity in the Sixth Judicial District 
Court of Kane County, State of Utah, which court is a court of record, when he 
issued the search warrant in this case. 
Article VIII, Section 7, Utah State Constitution, provides that judges of 
courts of record, other than the Supreme Court, must be at least 25 years of age, 
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United States citizens, Utah residents for at least three years, and must be 
admitted to practice law in Utah. This is simply another way of saying that a 
person, functioning in a judicial capacity, in a court of record, must be a member 
of the Utah State Bar. 
Further, Article VIII, Section 4, Utah State Constitution, provides that the 
Supreme Court, by rule, may authorize justices, judges, and judges pro tempore, 
to perform judicial duties. This is interesting, because Mr. Hoyt asserted that he 
was acting as a judge "pro tern". The cited Section 4, Article VIII, of the Utah 
State Constitution, requires that judges pro tempore must be citizens of the 
United States, Utah residents, admitted to practice law in Utah, and must be 
appointed by the Supreme Court, not by any District Court Judge; presiding, or 
otherwise. 
Although the State of Utah may claim that Mr. Gerry Hoyt was authorized 
by Judge Mower's order to issue a search warrant, it can be readily seen that any 
such order, and any rule purporting to authorize any such order, must be, and is, 
unconstitutional, since the Utah State Constitution specifically requires persons 
performing judicial functions, in a Court of record, in Utah, to be admitted to 
practice law. The purported order, and any rule, or rules, under which it might 
have been issued, effectively reduces the constitutional qualifications for the 
exercise of judicial functions in a Court of record. This cannot legally be done 
under the Utah Constitution. 
Since there was never any constitutional, or lawful, appointment of Mr. 
Hoyt, to issue search warrants, or otherwise function in District Court, the 
search warrant he issued is constitutionally unlawful, and must be quashed, and 
all evidence, related thereto, suppressed. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Point VI 
PURPORTED "EVIDENCE", OBTAINED UNDER THE INVALID 
SEARCH WARRANT, IS ALSO INADMISSIBLE, 
FOR THE REASONS STATED BELOW. 
Defendants assert that a review of the suppression hearing, in this matter, 
establishes the following: 
1. Certain accelerant samples were contaminated by being placed in, 
or exposed to, Tupperware containers; were otherwise subject to spoilage; were 
handled by unqualified personnel; and were, otherwise, inadmissible. [R. 492, 
p. 23-24] 
2. The alleged crime scene was not properly controlled, and it was 
accessed by many people, without the supervision of qualified personnel. [R. 
492, p.] 
3. There exists no complete, and proper, chain of evidence with 
respect to certain items; particularly, the samples. [R. 492, p. 80-81] 
4. The defense was not allowed to check samples of the purported 
accelerants before same were submitted by the State to the State Crime 
Laboratory for analysis; thus, resulting in a denial of due process of law. [R. 
492, p.] 
5. The "evidence" obtained, at the alleged crime scene, was not 
properly handled. There is no complete, or proper, evidentiary record of 
transfer of samples, from Lynn Borg, who allegedly collected many "accelerant" 
samples, to Tom Cram, who purported to function as evidence custodian. [R. 
492, p. 80-81,119] 
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6. The alleged accelerant samples were improperly stored in bottles, 
with rubber seals, (Mason jars with canning seals) which were, or probably 
could have been permeated by, or invaded by, petroleum products in the area, 
and thus contaminated before any analyses were conducted. Metallic seals 
should have been used. [R. 492, p. 82] 
7. The State produced no corroborating evidence concerning the 
matter of acquiring, and collecting, evidence, in the nature of photographs, 
drawings, or diagrams, showing the locations where evidence, or alleged 
accelerant samples, was obtained. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE II 
Point I 
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY FAILING TO 
CONDUCT A SUFFICIENT INQUIRY OF CERTAIN PROSPECTIVE 
JURORS WHO WERE SEATED TO TRY THE CASE. 
Ten jurors were seated to try the case. [R. 494, p 163] 
The trial judge has an affirmative duty to interview prospective jurors, 
sufficiently to determine whether each person can fairly try the case. See 
section 78-46-8, Utah Code annotated, 1953, as amended. 
78-46-8. 
Determination on juror qualification. 
The court, on its own initiative or when 
requested by a prospective juror, shall 
determine whether the prospective juror is , 
disqualified from jury service. The court 
shall base its decision on the information 
provided on the juror qualification form, 
or by interview with the prospective juror 
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or other competent evidence. The clerk 
shall enter the court's determination in the 
records of the court. 
(Amended by Chapter 219,1992 General Session) 
Further, quoting State v. Woolley 810 P.2d 440, (1991) the Utah Court of 
Appeals stated the following: 
* * * 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently emphasized 
that "it is [the trial Judge's] duty to see that the 
constitutional right of an accused to an impartial jury 
is safeguarded," State v. Dixon, 560 P.2d 318, 319-20 
(Utah 1977), and has reversed criminal convictions 
based solely on the appearance that such right may 
have been jeopardized. *fh4 Accordingly, trial courts 
must adequately probe a juror's potential bias when 
that juror's responses or other facts suggest a bias. The 
court's discretion is properly exercised when deciding 
whether to dismiss a juror for cause only after this 
investigation takes place. 
Juror impartiality is a "mental attitude of 
appropriate indifference." Bishop, 753 P.2d at 451 
(citing Brooks I, 563 P.2d at 801). "Chief Justice 
Marshall, presiding over the trial of Aaron Burr in 
1807, defined an impartial jury as one composed of 
Eersons who 'will fairly hear the testimony which may e offered to them, and bring in their verdict, 
according to that testimony, and according to the law 
arising on it.'" State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 
1980) (citations omitted). State v. Woolley 810P.2d 
440, (1991) 
* * * 
To put this issue into perspective, it is clear that some of the witnesses 
who testified for the State, in this jury trial, were Kanab City, and Kane County, 
employees, as follows: 
1. Sheldon Sorensen, Western Kane County Special Service District, [R. 
494, p. 194] 
2. Bret William Smith, Kanab City Police Department, [R. 494 p. 231 ] 
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3. Chief Alan Alldredge, a member of the Kanab City Fire Department 
[R. 494, p. 262] 
4. Captain Michael Royce, Utah Department of Public Safety, [R. 495, p. i 
331] 
5. Tracy Cutler, a member of the Kanab City Fire Department, [R. 495,p. 
367] 
6. Aaron Ray Wilson, a member of the Kanab City Fire Department, [R. . 
495, p. 398] 
7. Nathan Randolph White, A member of the Kanab City Fire 
Department, [R. 495, p. 413] 
8. Thomas Chad Cram, a member of the Kanab City Police Department, 
[R. 496, p. 791] 
9. Stanley Randolph White, Jr., Kanab City Building Inspector, building 
official, Zoning administrator, and on the volunteer fire department, 
[R. 496 , p. 821] 
10. Michael Ross Leighton, firefighter with the Kanab City Fire 
Department at the time of this fire. [R. 497, p. 863] 
The following colloquies, between the Court, counsel for the parties, and 
jurors, illustrate those instances where the trial judge committed plain error by 
failing to sufficiently inquire of prospective jurors who were seated to try the 
case. 
Juror, Scott Johnson, indicated that his wife works for Kanab City. [R. 
494, P. 3911. 21-24] The only follow up question by the Court was: "Does your 
wife work outside the home?" [R. 494, P.39,11. 25] 
The defense passed Scott Johnson, for cause, with the following 
discussion with the Court. 
9 THE COURT: Now, first, let's go down through. Scott 
10 Johnson. 
11 MR. HUMMEL: He's not related to anybody, right? 
12 THE COURT: No. 
13 MR. HUMMEL: Okay. So I don't have any for cause 
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against him. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, I have Wendy Harris. [R. 494, P. 147,11. 9-14] 
Juror, Wendy Harris, stated that her husband works for the County. [R. 
494, P. 40,11. 8-17] There was no meaningful follow up question by the Court. 
\R. 494, P. 40,116-18] 
That same Wendy Harris indicated that her brother was employed by the 
Kanab City Police Department and that her brother-in-law worked for the 
County. [R. 494, P.76,11. 5-11] The only follow up question by the Court was: 
"... and you feel in your mind you could treat them all...." [R. 494, P. 77,11. 2-
5] 
Juror, Justin Jones, stated that he lived on a ranch about sixty miles 
outside of Kanab. However, his statement is confusing because, in the same 
paragraph, he stated that he lives in Kanab. [R. 494 P. 43,11. 19-23] 
This author understands that statement of Mr. Jones to be a correction. 
He first stated that he lives in Kanab, and then corrected to state that he lives on 
a ranch, about sixty miles out of Kanab. 
At a post-trial motions hearing, counsel for Defendants proffered that the 
ranch, referred to by Justin Jones, is in Arizona [R. 503, p. 19,11. 12-18]; that 
Mr. Jones' trucks were registered in Arizona; that Mr. Jones had applied for an 
Arizona driver's license, giving an Arizona address; that he voted in Utah, and 
had a home in Utah, where he resides with his family. [R. 503 p. 19-20] 
Further, and before Justin Jones was seated as a juror, he stated that he 
had heard gossip about the case, and may have stated that he had talked to two 
witnesses about the case. [R. 494, p. 85-86] 
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The trial court made no further inquiry of Justin Jones, as to his place of 
residence, or his knowledge of the case. Further, the Judge never inquired of 
him as to whether he could judge the case fairly. 
Prior to seating the jury, the Trial Judge learned that jurors, Blain and 
Wendy Harris, were brother and sister-in-law. [R. 494, P. 148] The Judge 
made no follow up inquiry of Blain Harris. 
Of the ten jurors seated to try the case, not one was asked any pointed 
questions, which would determine their ability to fairly judge the case. One of 
the errors, discussed above, is egregious; to wit: the Trial Court's failure to 
follow up and ask Justin Jones what gossip he had heard about the case. Justin 
Jones knew something about the case [R. 494, P. 85]; however, with no follow 
up inquiry by the Court, we are left not knowing whom he had learned it from 
and what he had heard. We only know he had heard gossip about the case. Did 
that affect his ability to try the case fairly? Did that have an affect on the 
outcome of the trial? We will never know. 
Further, it appears that the Trial Judge never made any inquiry of the ten 
jurors seated in this case. That would lead one to conclude that those jurors 
could judge the case fairly and only on the evidence received at trial. 
* * * 
Case law is clear that the trial judge cannot 
leave that determination to conclusions drawn by the 
prospective jurors, themselves. See State v. Woolley 
810 P.2d 440, (1991) 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently 
emphasized that "it is [the trial Judge's] duty to see that 
the constitutional right of an accused to an impartial jury is safeguarded, State v. Dixon, 560 P.2d 318, 
319-20 (Utah 1977), and has reversed criminal 
convictions based solely on the appearance that such 
right may have been jeopardized. *fh4 Accordingly, 
Rnpfnn Anneal 
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trial courts must adequately probe a juror's potential 
bias when that juror's responses or other facts suggest 
a bias. The court's discretion is properly exercised 
when deciding whether to dismiss a juror for cause 
only after this investigation takes place. 
A party is entitled to use peremptory challenges 
to remove jurors who are not properly removed for 
cause. State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 883 (Utah 1981) 
("Brooks II"); State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 802-03 
(Utah 1977) ("Brooks I"); Crawford v. Manning, 542 
P.2d 1091,1093 (Utah 1975). It is prejudicial error to 
compel a party to exercise a peremptory challenge to 
remove a prospective juror who should have been 
removed for cause. Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 461; State v. 
Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1989). *m5 
A. Juror Impartiality 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
and the sixth amendment to the United States 
Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right 
to a trial by an impartial jury. See State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439,448 (Utah 1988). Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 18(e) implements these constitutional 
mandates and offers guidance as to when a juror 
should be removed for cause. This rule provides in 
relevant part: 
The challenge for cause is an objection to a 
particular juror and may be taken on one or more of 
the following grounds: ... 
(14) That a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to the cause, or to either party, 
which will prevent him from acting impartially and 
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party 
challenging.... Quoting State v. Woolley 810 P.2d 44-0, (1991) 
When an inference of bias is raised, the inference is 
generally not rebutted simply by a subsequent general 
statement by the juror that he or she can be fair and 
impartial. As the supreme court has stated," statement 
made by a juror that she intends to be fair and impartial 
loses much of its meaning in light of other testimony and 
facts which suggest a bias." State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 
26 (quoting Jenkins, 627 P.2d at 536). Accordingly, "the 
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i 
court, not the juror, must determine a juror's 
qualifications." State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473,475 (Utah 
1987) (quoting Brooks II, 631 P.2d at 884). Quoting State I 
v. Woolley 810 P.2d 440, (Ct. App. 1991) 
* * * 
By no means did the Trial Court, in the instant case, make sufficient 
i 
inquiry of any of the prospective jurors as to their lack of bias. This Court is, 
therefore, requested to compare the facts of this case to the facts, and holding, in 
State v Bailey, 605 P. 2d at 771 (Utah. 1980) and Brooks II, 631 P. 2d at 878 
(Utah 1981) 
Those facts are summarized in the Paul Edwin Woolley opinion, supra, as 
follows: 
* * * 
Utah case law is helpful in determining the 
depth of inquiry which has been sufficient to clarify 
potential juror bias. In Bailey, 605 P.2d at 771, the 
defendant was charged with distribution of a 
controlled substance. At trial, the only witness to 
testify was the undercover police officer who made the 
arrest. During voir dire of the jury panel, prospective jurors were asked if they would be inclined to give the 
testimony of a police officer greater weight than that 
of a witness who was not a police officer. A 
prospective juror stated, "you can rely upon their 
testimony and their background to the utmost.... I 
would want to stand behind them a hundred percent." 
Id. at 768. In response to this facial comment of bias, 
the trial court responded by asking only one question 
as to the juror's expressed bias. Being satisfied that the juror could act impartially
 ? the court did not remove 
the juror for cause. Id. Ultimately, the defendant was 
convicted and appealed. The supreme court reversed 
and remanded, noting that the trial court's minimal 
investigation and questioning was insufficient to rebut 
the inference of bias. The court stated that "the Court's 
one question was not sufficient to rebut this inference," 
adding that "the Court had insufficient evidence on 
which to base a Conclusion that there was no bias...." 
Id. 
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In Jonas, 793 P.2d at 902, the trial Judge asked 
eleven different questions in establishing the 
impartiality of a prospective juror who had been the 
victim of a theft, the crime with which the defendant 
was charged. Similarly, in Salt Lake City v. Tuero, 745 
P.2d 1281 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the trial court made 
"significant efforts" to determine if a potential juror in 
a case involving driving under the influence of alcohol 
could remain unbiased given the fact that his wife had 
been "broadsided by a drunk driver." Id. at 1282. 
The depth of questioning necessary is further 
illustrated by a case very similar to the instant case; 
Brooks II, 631 P.2d at 878. Brooks II involved a 
defendant charged with burglary for unlawfully 
entering a basement apartment with the intent to 
commit theft. During voir dire of the jury venire, two 
prospective jurors stated that they had been victims of 
the same or similar crimes. One juror responded that 
his home had been burglarized twice. The other juror 
noted that she had been the victim of an armed robbery 
and assault in her home. Because of the possible biases 
created by this prior victimization, the court asked 
multiple questions of these two jurors. Both jurors 
indicated that they had strong feelings about their 
experiences but felt that they could render a fair and 
impartial verdict based on the evidence. Both jurors, 
therefore, were retained. 
On appeal, the supreme court held that the jurors 
had not been rehabilitated by the court's questioning 
and should have been excused for cause. See id.; see 
also Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 459 (A prospective juror 
made statements that evidenced a lack of 
understanding of the prosecution's burden of proof and 
the defendants right not to take the stand. The trial 
Judge asked the juror fourteen questions before 
determining that he need not be excused for cause. 
The supreme court affirmed.); Cobb, 11A P.2d at 1123 
(A prospective juror in a second-degree murder trial 
expressed strong feelings against the taking of human 
life. This juror was asked eleven questions before the 
court determined that he could serve impartially. The 
supreme court affirmed.); *fh7 Julian. Ill P.2d at 
1061 (Prospective juror in a trial involving charges of 
sodomy on a child made comments which facially 
indicated she was predisposed to believe the victims' 
testimony and was thus incapable of rendering an 
impartial verdict. This juror was asked twenty separate 
^onnmiA/i r» A T» 1 A _ C A r-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
questions before the trial court decided she could act 
impartially. On appeal, the supreme court held that the juror had been rehabilitated.); Tuero, 745 P.2d at 1283 
(The wife of a prospective juror in a case involving 
driving under the influence of alcohol had been 
"broadsided by a drunk driver." The court made 
"significant efforts" to determine that this Juror could 
remain unbiased. The court of appeals affirmed.); 
Layton City v. Bennett, 741 P.2d965, 967 (Utah Ct. 
App.) (The defendant in a trial involving driving under 
the influence of alcohol believed that two prospective jurors were partial. One juror was associated with 
Mothers Against Drunk Drivers; the other juror was a 
reserve police officer in an adjoining city. Before these jurors were impaneled, they gave "substantial 
assurances," by way of responses to "specific, detailed 
questioning" by the court, that they could be fair and 
impartial. The court of appeals affirmed.), cert, denied, 
765 P.2d 1277 (1987). 
Again Quoting State v. Woolley 810 P.2d 440, (Ct. App. 1991): 
Once a juror's impartiality has been put in doubt, 
a trial Judge must investigate by further questions to 
determine if the juror has merely "light impressions" 
or impressions which are "strong and deep and which 
will affect the juror's impartiality. "When comments 
are made which facially question a prospective juror's 
impartiality or prejudice, an abuse of discretion may 
occur unless the challenged juror is removed by the 
court or unless the court or counsel investigates and 
finds the inference rebutted." State v. Cobb, 11\ P.2d 
1123,1126 (Utah 1989); see also Bishop, 735 P.2d at 
451. 
We find no distinction in Utah case law between 
a "question of bias" and an "inference of bias." 
Furthermore, we find no good policy reason not to 
require probing to clarity any possible prejudice when 
fundamental rights are at stake. 
B. Investigation Necessary to Probe Potential Bias 
The level of investigation necessary once voir 
dire reveals potential juror bias will vary from case to 
case and is necessarily dependent on the iuror's 
responses to the questions asked. Nevertheless, the 
exploration should not be merely pro forma. 
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When an inference of bias is raised, the 
inference is generally not rebutted simply by a 
subsequent general statement by the juror that he or 
she can be fair and impartial. As the supreme court has 
stated, "statement made by a juror that she intends to 
be fair and impartial loses much of its meaning in light 
of other testimony and facts which suggest a bias." 
State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 26 (quoting Jenkins, 627 
P.2d at 536). Accordingly, "the court, not the juror, 
must determine a juror's qualifications. "State v. Jones, 
734 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987) (quoting Brooks II, 631 
P.2dat884). 
* * * 
Below from Woolley Id., 
* * * 
A party is entitled to use peremptory challenges 
to remove jurors who are not properly removed for 
cause. State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 883 (Utah 1981) 
CBrooks IT); State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 802-03 
(Utah 1977) V'Brooks I"); Crawford v. Manning, 542 
P.2d 1091,1093 (Utah 1975). It is prejudicial error to 
compel a party to exercise a peremptory challenge to 
remove a prospective juror who should have been 
removed for cause. Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 461; State v. 
Julian, 111 P.2d 1061,1064 (Utah 1989). ^ M 
* * * 
Insufficient inquiry into the demonstrated potential for juror bias brings 
into question the fairness of the trial. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE III 
FOUR AFFIDAVITS WERE FILED WITH THE COURT ALLEGING 
CONVERSATIONS OCCURRED BETWEEN MRS. WINCHESTER, WIFE 
OF THE STATES PROSECUTOR, AND MEMBERS OF THE JURY, AND 
THE RECORD CONFIRMS THAT MRS. WINCHESTER OBSERVED PART 
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i 
OF THE PROCEEDINGS, WHILE SEATED WITH LINDA CHATTERLY, 
WIFE OF JUROR, TONY CHATTERLY. [R. 503 p. 33,11. 6-8] < 
Affidavit of Robert Beltran [R. 276-277] 
Affidavit of Dorothy Carpenter [R. 450-449] 
Affidavit of James E. Kropf [B-R. 448- 445, A-R. 272-275] { 
Affidavit of Lisa Holmes [R. 439] see addendum 
Mrs. Winchester stated that she was present most of the days of the trial, 
arriving after work, between 1:30 and 2:00 P.M.; [R. 503, p.48,11. 12-18] 
however, the affidavits show different times. 
In this particular trial, according to the physical arrangement in this 
courtroom, the jury box is, at the closest point, eight feet away from the 
audience. 
There is a door that leads from the courtroom, into a public hall, and that 
door is the one that is, most often, used by the jurors on the east side, as they 
come and go. That is also used by the general public, or could be used by the 
general public, if they so desired. 
That door has a lock on it. If it is open, the public can come in and out; if 
it is not open, the public cannot access the east door. During breaks, it was 
open. 
The jury, in this trial, did not wear any name badges that identified them 
as jurors; nothing that anyone could observe, and be alerted by, as that is 
somebody I shouldn't talk to; or, I shouldn't talk around that person because 
he/she is a juror. 
They congregated, until deliberation; not in a secured area, like a jury 
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room, but they congregated in the public halls, public areas, in the same places 
as any of the people observing, or participating in, the trial. [R. 503, p.50,11. 4-
25,p.51,p.52,ll. 1-12] 
In his affidavit, Mr. Beltran states that, during a morning break, on June 
23, he saw Mrs. Winchester talking to Juror, Cheryl Brown, in the hall, behind 
the judge's chamber doors. [R.503, p. 22 11. 13-15], [A-R. 277, 276] 
In the affidavit filed by James E. Kropf, [R.448- 445] he states that he 
saw a non-juror female that was with a group of female jurors. In paragraph 15, 
of the Kropf affidavit, the affiant identifies the non-juror female as Mrs. 
Winchester. [R.503, P. 40] [B-R. 275-272] 
24 MR. HUMMEL: If you read the affidavit of Jim 
25 Kropf. 
[R. 503,p. 16,11. 24-25] 
1 THE JUDGE: Well, as I read that I think he's 
2 talking about potentially different conversations. I thought 
3 he talked about having seen the prosecutor's wife in a 
4 discussion but then also, but then in addition to that 
5 describes a female member of the group believed to be a jury 
6 panel member talking with several other persons, other 
7 females, and saying I can't understand most of what they're 
8 talking about, it's not making sense, followed by an 
9 expression of understanding and some (inaudible word) with 
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10 comments such as I know what you mean. 
11 Tm not necessarily tying the two together. 
12 MR. HUMMEL: And I guess that's the peril of not 
13 having that person testify. My, my interpretation is that 
14 it's linked together in the same conversation. Now, I may 
15 be wholly 100% completely wrong, as may the Court in that 
16 interpretation. We're both I guess reading from, from 
17 different perspectives in that circumstance, Your Honor. 
[R. 503, p. 17,11. 1-17] 
In an affidavit filed by Dorothy Carpenter, she states that she saw Mrs. 
Winchester "... with her arm upon a wall, speaking to jury member, Wendy 
Harris, talking in quiet and private voice, by the vending machine, in the 
hallway of the Kane County Court, during the afternoon break of June 22, 
2000." 
She saw Mrs. Winchester "... talking to juror Cheryl Brown, in the hall 
behind the judge's chamber doors, during the break at approximately 9:45 A.M. 
on June 23,2000, in the Kane County Courthouse." [B-R. 450^49] 
Not all the complications, in this case, due to inappropriate appearing 
conversations, may ever be known. What is known is that the questions raised 
cast a shroud over the fairness of the process. 
Fairness is inherent to our concept of justice. In that context, the two 
words are virtually synonymous. In the instant case, the ideal has been lost. 
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In the instant case, complications to fairness were rendered by juror 
misconduct, and / or jury tampering, in the form of ex parte contact, between 
two jurors, and the wife of a third juror, by the wife of the States Prosecutor, 
while the trial was in progress. 
Whether the communications engaged in by the wife of the State's 
Prosecutor, with these jurors, and their relatives, were innocent, or not, will 
always remain a question. Was the wife of the State's Prosecutor seeking feed 
back, in order to steer her husband in his prosecution of the case, or did she 
think she was innocently discussing school events with these jurors? Surely, 
she would, as did others, recognize that these people could not help but be 
influenced, on behalf of the prosecution, by her mere presence in the courtroom, 
let alone being informed, and reminded, daily, of the inter-relationships that 
existed in their lives, causing a bias in favor of her husband's goal, and career. 
Bystanders recognized it, and Lisa Holmes was sufficiently disturbed by 
the actions of Mrs. Rebecca Winchester, the wife of the States Prosecutor, to 
send a sworn statement of protest to the Honorable K. L. Mclff, Trial Judge, in 
the instant case. Therein, she expressed the outrage felt by how many? She 
states: 
"I would like to protest an injustice done during the trial of "St. UT vs 
Dorothy (Dee) Carpenter & Robert Beltran which was conducted on the dates of 
June 19,2000 through June 26,2000. 
As mother of the underage witness for the Prosecution, I had opportunity 
to observe the proceedings and recesses during those dates. On more than one 
occaision (sic) Rebecca Winchester (wife of the Prosecuting Attorney) was seen 
speaking to certain members of the jury. Although their various conversations 
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might have been entirely innocuous, I feel that there is a reasonable doubt 
concerning this issue. Why would the wife of an attorney be isolating individual 
jurors for discussions carried on in confidential murmurs? Each of these was 
held in a quiet byway. If there was factual information to be expressed, why not 
present it through the proper procedures? It is unseemly for the Jury Foreman or 
any other juror to be in private discussion with someone who constitutes an 
inherent conflict of interest! Sincerely, Lisa Holmes." [B-R.439,] A copy of 
the Lisa Holmes sworn, notarized, "letter" does not appear in the Beltran record 
ofcase #981600101. 
A search of the records does not reflect that the Trial Court reviewed the 
Holmes sworn, notarized, "letter", except that it was acknowledged in the 
November 22,2000 hearing, [R. 503] but not treated in any formal way. In the 
record, we find only this reference to the Holmes "letter": 
19 THE JUDGE: All right. Let me just note for the 
20 record that in the, in the Carpenter file I do have a 
21 handwritten letter from is it Lois Holm (phonetic)? 
22 MR. WINCHESTER: Lisa apparently. 
23 THE JUDGE: Lisa Holm (phonetic). She does not 
24 refer to anything specific, no one by name. She says on 
25 more than one occasion Rebecca Winchester was seen 
1 speaking. She doesn't even take credit for that. 
2 MR.HUMMEL: Andldon't--
3 THE JUDGE: No indication she has firsthand 
4 knowledge. 
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[R. 503, P. 38,11. 19-25, P. 39,11. \-A] 
In the limited query, held by the Trial Judge, into the perception of bias 
and undue influence of the jurors, a search of the record does not reflect that 
Lisa Holmes was called to testify. [R. 503, 504] 
Lest we forget, Lisa Holmes, mother of an "underage witness" for the 
prosecution, was sufficiently disturbed, by the interactions of members of the 
jury, and the wife of the State's Prosecutor, that she bothered to ascertain, if she 
did not already know, the procedure for putting her misgivings before the Court 
in a bona fide manner; when most people "don't want to become involved". 
Does Lisa Holmes know the consideration her willingness, to become 
involved, received? 
How may others observed some activities that demeaned the fairness of 
the justice system, but did not come forward and voice or register a complaint, 
lest they become "involved"? 
The aforementioned affidavit of James Knopf also reflects the observation 
of presumed misdeeds on the part of Rebecca Winchester, the wife of the State's 
Prosecutor; but it appears, from the record, that the judge specifically prohibited 
the calling of Mr. Knopf, even though there was a disagreement between the 
judge, and the defense counsel, as to the interpretation of the Knopf affidavit. 
[B-R. 448- 445, A-R. 272-275] [R. 503, P. 40,] 
Further, the Trial Judge did not call Linda Chatterly, wife of, Alternate 
Juror, Tony Chatterly, to inquire as to the conversations of Linda Chatterly with 
Mrs. Winchester, or what she might have repeated to her husband, alternate 
juror Tony Chatterly. The Trial Judge did not inquire into what conversations 
that Mrs. Chatterly had had with her husband about the trial, nor whether she 
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had repeated any of his comments to Mrs. Winchester, thereby creating 
feedback information for the State's Prosecutor, as to the perception of the 
State's case by the jury. If any of this occurred, it would have had the same 
effect; whether done innocently, or maliciously. 
Combine this with the warrant issue, which, at best, requires that we 
suspend reality; and at worst, hang it by its neck until it is dead, and we have a 
case that stretches, the whole cloth of fairness, past the limits of reality. 
If an appearance of fairness is to be maintained, the warrant, in the instant 
case, must be suppressed, along with all the evidence produced, and any 
testimony relying, on or pertaining to, said evidence. 
A new trial must be granted, due to the conduct of the certain jurors and 
parties, related to, or involved with, the prosecution. As in Budoffv. Holiday 
Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 1523 (6th Cir. 1984): 
Wrongful death verdict was vacated and the case 
remanded for a new trial because the plaintiff s 
counsel's employee's child contacted a juror's child and 
discussed the case. Court held that the "administration 
of justice" required finding misconduct when a person 
under the supervision of counsel initiates a private 
contact with those close to jurors. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE IV 
THE STATE DID NOT PROVE THE IGNITION SOURCE OF 
THE INSTANT FIRE; THEREFORE, IT FAILED TO MEET THEIR 
BURDEN UNDER UTAH CODE ANN § 76-6-103,1995. 
Nowhere in the record of this trial is there direct testimony by 
^r\ n A C T*ri^f nr» Anneal 
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competent witnesses to the effect that a certain flammable additive was 
used to start the instant fire. 
Nowhere in the record of this trial is there direct testimony by 
competent witnesses, to the effect that a certain source of ignition was 
used to start the instant fire. 
Nowhere in the record of this trial is there direct testimony, by 
competent witnesses, to the effect that Defendant / Appellant Robert 
Beltran ignited the instant fire. 
Nowhere in the record of this trial is there direct testimony, by 
competent witnesses, to the effect that Defendant / Appellant Dorothy 
Dee Carpenter ignited the instant fire. 
Quoting from KIRK'S FIRE INVESTIGATION, Fifth Edition, John 
D. DeHann, PhD., © 2002 by Pearson Education, Inc., Published by 
Prentice-Hall, page 173. 
"If the investigator cannot identify the fuel first ignited, the ignition 
source competent to ignite that fuel and the circumstances that brought 
that fuel and that ignition source together, the cause cannot be 
conclusively established." 
Quoting Supreme Court of Utah, 01/16/80 State v Lamm and 
Roy, 606? 2A229: 
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is 
presumed to be innocent until each 
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element of the offense charged against 
him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In absence of such proof, the defendant 
shall be acquitted. Lamm and Roy, Id., 
The following from Blacks Law Dictionary, seventh edition: 
1. "proximate cause", ... 2 A cause that directly produces an event and 
without which the event would not have occurred. 
The State Fire Marshal, Lynn Borg, testified, "No, I don't know exactly 
what ignited that attic fire". [R. 496, p. 616,11. 17] 
The States Prosecuting Attorney, Colin Winchester, stated clearly in his 
closing argument,"... a slow burning source? I can't tell you. Our expert never 
found the source for this. An electrical fire rigged somehow in--I can't tell you. 
We have seen lights that were in the area that the expert says probably were not 
the cause. But something happened in that attic and I submit to you that it was 
not wholly accidental." [R.500, p. 21,11. 20-25] 
Quoting from Lamm and Roy Id., at: 
*fh23 See State v. Gosby, (supra) note 17, at 73; 
In Gosby the court concluded: "If the only proof 
concerning the essential element of the crime is 
circumstantial, it cannot constitute proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt if it is consistent with a reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence, even though it is also 
consistent with the reasonable hypothesis of guilt." 
* * * . 
And again from Lamm and Roy Id., 
•ml 6 State v. Burch, 100 Utah 414,115 P.2d 
911 (1941); See also State v. Hughes, (supra) note 15, 
at 441. The Washington Supreme Court explained: 
"An essential element of a crime may not be proved by 
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circumstantial evidence alone unless this evidence is 
inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence and consistent with a reasonable hypothesis 
of guilt"; State v. Rincones, 209 Kan. 176,495 P.2d 
1019,1022, (1972). The Kansas Supreme Court 
expressed the rule: "Material facts in a criminal case 
may be established by circumstantial evidence so long 
as that evidence satisfies the applicable requirements 
of consistency with guilt and inconsistency with 
innocence..."; Nunn v. People, 177 Colo. 87, 493 P.2d 
6, 8 (1972). The Colorado Supreme Court explained: 
"In Cobianchi v. People, 11 Colo. 298,141 P.2d 688, 
it was held that a conviction could not stand where the 
people's case was dependent solely upon 
circumstantial evidence which was consistent with 
guilt, but also equally consistent with the innocence of 
the accused." 
Nowhere in the record of this trial is there direct testimony, by competent 
witnesses, to the effect that Appellants engaged anyone else to ignite the instant 
Nowhere in the record of this trial is there direct testimony, by competent 
witnesses, to the effect that other suspects were investigated and eliminated, 
regarding their involvement in the fire at the Frontier Barbecue. 
However, a look at the testimony of Michael Leighton, a firefighter for 
the Kanab City Fire Department, [R. 497, p. 865,11. 1-2] who testified in the 
preliminary hearing, [R. 491, pp. 130-147] and in the trial, [R. 497. pp. 863-
868, 913-914] is enlightening. During his testimony in the preliminary hearing, 
he refused to answer questions, pleading the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, seven (7) times, [R.491, p. 131,11. 6, 23, p. 132,11. 15, 8, 23, 
p. 133,11,3,7] and three (3) times, when he testified in the trial. [R. 497, p. 913, 
11.1-12] 
Specifically, at [R. 491, p. 131,11. 1-6] he plead the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution in response to his involvement in money taken 
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from the cash register of the Frontier Barbecue while he was there as a 
firefighter, and again, at [R. 497,913,11. 9-13], he plead the Fifth Amendment ^ 
to the United States Constitution in response a question regarding arson charges, 
while he was a firefighter in New Hampshire. 
According to the record, Michael Leighton had been arrested, and was ( 
under investigation, by Utah Law Enforcement officials, at the time of the 
preliminary hearing. By the time of this trial, Michael Leighton was an inmate, 
with the Utah Department of Corrections, serving a prison sentence at Purgatory ' 
Correctional Facility, having pleaded guilty in Kane County, in 1999, to two 
third degree felony burglaries. Ten (10) other burglary charges were dropped in 
exchange for his plea. [R. 497, p. 864] , 
Leighton served as a volunteer firefighter in Milan, New Hampshire, Las 
Vegas, Nevada, and Kanab, Utah. 
While in Las Vegas, he was convicted of felony possession of a stolen 
vehicle and served 19 months in the correctional facility at Indian Springs, 
Nevada. [R. 491, p. 141,11. 4-13, p. 143,11.12-23] 
Leighton had a substance abuse problem while in Kanab and during the 
time of the Frontier Barbeque fire. He was abusing Crystal Methamphetamine 
and Heroin. [R. 497, p. 90811. 6-12] 
The morning of the Frontier Barbecue fire, according to his testimony, he 
was first alerted about the fire at 4:20 A.M., through the scanner he maintained 
in his residence, and arrived at the Kanab Fire Station at 4:22 A.M., "Just took a 
couple of minutes to get there." He was the second firefighter to arrive at the 
station. [R. 497, p. 870,11. 4-21] 
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Nothing in the record tells us whether the State considered him as a 
suspect incendiary in the fire at the Frontier Barbeque, and whether, or not, he, 
or any one else, was investigated, and/or eliminated, as a potential incendiary. 
CONCLUSION 
The subject Search Warrant fails to particularly describe the things to be 
seized. The Search Warrant, in this case, was not a lawful warrant; rather, 
merely a constitutionally prohibited "General Warrant". 
The Trial Court erred in denying Defendants' / Appellants' motion to 
quash the search warrant and suppress the evidence seized. 
The Trial Judge committed plain error by failing to conduct a sufficient 
inquiry of certain prospective jurors who were seated to try the case. 
Juror misconduct occurred, resulting in undisclosed bias and prejudice, 
during the trial, due to ex parte contact by Rebecca Ann Winchester, 276 South 
100 West, Kanab, Utah, who is married to Colin Winchester, then County 
Attorney for Kane County, and prosecutor for the Plaintiff, the State of Utah, in 
this case. The State did not prove the ignition source of the instant fire; 
therefore, they failed to meet their burden, under Utah Code Ann § 76-6-103, 
1995. 
Defendants' / Appellants' pray this Court will supppress the Search 
warrant, and, strike all of Lynn Borgs testimony, as fruit of the poisonous tree if 
the search warrant is suppressed. 
Defendants' / Appellants' further pray this Court will reverse and remand 
this case for a new trial. 
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Dated this, 2001 
I1MC ^k 
Jim R. Scarth 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, 
first class postage prepaid, this 12 day of August, 2002, to: 
Mark Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General 
KentM. Barry 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South - 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee, 
Jim R. Scarth 
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TN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY 
STAT5 OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF C7TAH. 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v. 
JOHN DOC, 
defendant * 
AFFIDAVIT OF ALAN ALLOREDGE 
Case No. 9*1*00031 
JUDG6 DAVID L- **C**5R 
STATE Of UTAH ) 
) mm-
comrrr OF RANI ) 
ALAN ALLDR5DGE, being first duly sworn, deposes and says; 
1. 1 am a certified firefighter, and am the Chief of the 
ftp** City rire Department. 
2. At approximately 4 = IS a.m. on March 24. 14*0, a fire 
was observed at the Frontier Ber-B*Q a Steak Restaurant, located 
at 114J South Highway 8*A, Kanab. Kane County, Utah-
4- The fire was first observed by fcanab resident Dsve 
Winitleean, who went -o the residence of Robert Schafer, who in 
» »d Hi*os «nit ww* W ^ W B esrsT leec/WiS" 
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turn called Kane County Dispatch. * 
J. Prior co che time firefighters arrived. Dave tfinXlemen 
and Ksneb City Police officer Brett: Smith entered che building co 
enaure chat no one wa*i inside- The basement of the building is 
purportedly used by the owners of the business as a residence. 
No one was located inside the building. 
4- The fire caused substantial damage to the roof and 
dining area located i» the southwest corner of th« building. The 
fire also caused smoke deinage throughout: the building. 
5 The suppression of the fire caused water damage 
chrou^houT; the building. 
• t+ In che two basement bedrooms, located on the west aide 
of che building, drawers had been removed from dressers and 
stacked up in a pyramid fashion, much like a person would stack 
wood for a ceoipfire or a bonfire. 
7. Parts of che dryvall ceiling above che scacks of 
drawers had been cue and torn away, exposing th« door joists. 
The drywall pieces Jiad been removed from the building, and as of 
che time this Affidavit was executed, have not been located* 
t. There is a strong smell of solvent- such ae paint ~ 
thinner, paint remover, or turpentine, throughout the basement. 
9. There i* a storage closet in the basement, used as a 
food pantry for the restaurant. The storage closet/food paltry 
is located on the wenst side of che building, between che two 
2 
i 
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bedroea*. 
10. The Solvent smell is stronger in the storage 
closat/S^od pantry than it la throughout the rest of tho 
basement, 
11. Pert of the dr/wall ceiling of the storage cioeet/Cood 
pantry has been cut end torn away, exposing th* floor )oiets~ 
The dry*all pieces had been removed from the building, «r»d a* of 
the cii*e this Affidavit w4$ axecu^ed, have not been located. On 
the top ehalf o£ the storage closet /food pantry * ju« beneath the 
removed drywell, packages of restaurant style napkins have been 
plaoed mt intervals, rather chan stacked neatly together. 
IJ. The purported owners of the business, Dorothy Cazyanc^r 
and Eobert freltran. are. according to Ranab resident Joe Johnson, 
in the Phoenix or Hess area, and have been out of town for 
several days Mr. Johnson ic an auto body repairifean/ mechanic, 
and la working onHs. Carpenter's 1**1 Camaro. 
1). In the restaurant Kitchen, which xa located in the 
southeast portion of th* main floor, there is « 1/2 gallon 
container of orange juice on a table or countertop, with a small 
astou&t of orange juice still present. Located next to the orange 
juice container is a coffee cup filled approximately 1/2 full of 
orange juice. M approxintataly T:00 a.m. on the morning of Hatch 
24, l**e, the orange juice in tha container and the orange juice 
in che coffee cup %*«re cold to the touch. 
** ami 
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rVKTKSit AFFIANT SAYETH MOT. 
DATED Chi» 2«ch ©£ March. 1999 
AIAK ALLDREDGE 
IJOTXKV PUBLIC 
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/ Sergeant Thomas C Cram, by whom the Warrant was executed, do swear the above 
listed inventory contains a true and detailed account of all the property taken by me under 
the warrant on March 24, 199%. 
All of the property taken by me by virtue of said Warrant will be retained in my 
custody subject to the order of this court or of any other court in which the offense in respect 
to which the property or thinp taken is triable 
timas C, Cram, Sergeant 
Kanab City Police Department 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to beforrme this 26th day of March, 1998 
( 
! 
NotaryTublic ^-^ ^ 
Commission Expiration Date 
/ 
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